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I

n the last half-decade, the “rise of the left” in Latin America has been
studied extensively by many scholars. Whether framed as one, two,
or many lefts, its various party leaders have been vocal in opposition to
neoliberalism, although the orientation of their policies and governments toward neoliberalism has been mixed (Panizza 2009). The most
influential and visible case of an antineoliberal government is that of
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías.
The five books reviewed here, drawing on research on Venezuela,
share a common scholarly interest in liberalism, pluralism, and accountability, although some defend liberalism (Brewer-Carías, Corrales and
Penfold), while Fernandes aims to move beyond liberalism. They make
significant improvements in the contours and concepts used to explore
contemporary Venezuelan politics and hint at incipient possibilities for
understanding the contemporary liberalism and the possibility of a
postliberal politics in Latin America (see Arditi 2008, 80; Oxhorn and
Postero 2010, 12). This latter point is particularly crucial as it is a scholarly terra incognita that will need to receive more attention in coming
years.
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SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS

The tensions between liberal and alternative visions of democracy
(prominent in discussions in the 1990s) reverberate in recent academic literature on Latin America, although, as Philip Oxhorn and
Nancy Postero note, the debate has shifted from “what democracy is”
(procedural versus substantive accounts) to analyzing “the potential
that political or liberal democracy has for achieving accountable,
responsive governments that strive to ensure greater social inclusion”
(2010, 13). This has been especially visible in the shift from typologizing the “rise of the left” (Castañeda 2006) to attempts to analyze
what the leftist governments do once in office (Panizza 2009; Weyland
et al. 2010).
Arguably, there is no more important case for examining alternative
models than that of Bolivarian Venezuela, and scholars approaching this
subject have followed the trend away from earlier literature centered on
the person of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez toward the study of
Chavismo and the Chávez government. With the mystery surrounding
President Chávez’s bout with cancer beginning in 2011, the refusal to
transfer power to a vice president, the lack of transparency regarding
his illness, and the rise of his brother, Adán Chávez, Chavismo must be
considered with a possibly temporarily weaker Hugo Chávez, or without him altogether. Of the books reviewed here, Hawkins, Gates, and
Fernandes analyze Chavismo, while Corrales and Penfold, BrewerCarías, and Hawkins address the regime that is being formed. The shift
from Chávez to Chavismo, however, continues to highlight the resonance of debates along a liberal-antiliberal axis.

LIBERALISM

AND

PLURALISM

IN

VENEZUELA

Brewer-Carías, a prominent Venezuelan jurist and public intellectual
before the rise of Chávez, indicts the Chávez regime for assaulting
democracy through the destruction of liberal mechanisms of political
pluralism. His book is a constitutional argument against the Chávez government. It begins and ends with the definition of democracy contained
in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, a definition that emphasizes
the rule of law, pluralism, separation of powers, and individual freedoms (9). Chávez opposed the charter because it was excessively liberal, because it did not include Cuban “democracy,” and because he
thought it would be used against his regime. The double irony is that
the charter provided normative support for Chávez when he was
removed from office in April 2002, while Brewer-Carías allegedly (he
denies this in the book) gave legal advice to, if not drafted, the document used by the interim government that replaced Chávez.
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Brewer-Carías focuses on the use of semidemocratic means to
destroy democracy, particularly those that have undermined Venezuela’s
tradition of constitutionalism, beginning with the creation of the 1999
Constitution (the country’s 26th) and ending with the violation of that
charter by the government. He begins by highlighting the unconstitutional means by which the Constituent Assembly was called and how the
Constituent Assembly removed all officials from office save the president.
The abuses of constitutionalism were so severe, he argues, that a coup
was conducted through a nonconsensual form of constitutionmaking.
Much of this is familiar ground, although it is notable for its emphasis on constitutionality. It tends to lose appeal when the book becomes
an opportunity to make bold partisan statements, such as “the government has made every imaginable effort to provoke a political and social
definitive confrontation and to complete its total destruction of the
country, its institutions, and what remains of democracy after being progressively dismantled” (412) and there is no “separation or independence of the different branches of government, not only in their horizontal division but also in their vertical distribution” (370).
This sort of phrasing makes it more difficult to take other appraisals
more seriously. For example, Brewer-Carías asserts that Venezuela has
never seen such “a party autocracy as the one now seen that admits no
dissidence” (373), an important claim, given how critical of the partyarchic Punto Fijo system Chávez has been. The assertion is somewhat
problematic for the author if the PSUV (the ruling United Socialist Party
of Venezuela) is more powerful than parties under the previous period
or the leader’s authority is derivative of the party. Either suggests that
the party has an agency that is independent of its leader, a claim that
appears at odds with the claim that all accountability mechanisms have
been destroyed.
Similarly, throughout the book, Brewer-Carías makes the interesting
claim that the 2000 Constitution makes the unicameral National Assembly the most powerful branch of the government. Even if that power is
latent while the Assembly’s majority supports the president, it is unclear
why President Chávez would have supported such a powerful legislative branch, which could work as a check against executive authority, if
he intended, as Brewer-Carías assumes, to remain in the presidency for
many years.
Despite the limitations due to language and some problematic assertions, Brewer-Carías’s book is a good introduction to the constitutionality surrounding the question of how to understand when democratic
means might be used to undermine liberal democracy. A wider-ranging
and more analytical approach appears in Corrales and Penfold’s book.
Building on their solo academic work, Corrales and Penfold argue that
the Chávez government cleverly uses both democratic and nondemocra-
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tic means to weaken liberal institutions and to bring about a wholesale
regime change. Although the two political scientists critique the antiliberal means used by Chávez and his supporters, their focus is on the formation of an illiberal hybrid regime, which they see as interesting
because of its influence in Latin America and the appeal of antiliberal
regimes in the developing world more generally (see Schedler 2006).
Corrales and Penfold argue that while Chávez and Chavismo have
always been illiberal, they have radicalized over time (8, 47). Indeed,
Chávez’s 1998 coalition was not especially radical (see also Ellner 2008;
Gates). But while Ellner (2008), Hellinger (2005), and others see the radicalization as a process of building legitimacy to repair a trust deficit
after neoliberalism, Corrales and Penfold see polarization as a political
strategy to gain legitimacy at the expense of delegitimizing opponents,
institutions, and constraints.
They take an “institutional resource curse” approach to explain the
form of state emerging in Venezuela. They argue that once the executive branch controlled the state oil company (PDVSA), Chávez was able
directly to “distribute oil rents to the population without any intermediation from other political actors after 2007” (6). This created the conditions for a hybrid regime while also weakening the possibility for opposition dissidence.
A particularly important chapter of the book deals with a foreign
policy puzzle that may very well be a microcosm for scholarly efforts to
understand Venezuelan politics in the past decade. It asks, why does a
Venezuelan regime led by Hugo Chávez, which has some legitimate
incentive to balance against the United States, tend to overbalance in
some areas (against U.S. “aggression,” excessive spending on foreign
alliances) and underbalance in others (vulnerability and dependence on
U.S. oil purchases)? That is, rather than see the Chávez government’s
foreign policy as holistically anti-U.S. or driven by the demands of an
oil-producing state, the authors find what appear to be inconsistencies
within foreign policy, inconsistencies that are better explained through
understanding Venezuela as a hybrid regime.
Another important assertion, meant as a corrective on conventional
wisdom, is that neoliberal economic reforms “never really took hold in
Venezuela” (5). The claim is counterintuitive, given empirical studies of
contentious politics that find the base of Chavista support in antineoliberal protest. But it may also be counterintuitive because antineoliberalism may need to be unpacked (Panizza 2009; Silva 2009), something
Gates does.
Gates’s book focuses on the 1998 presidential elections in
Venezuela, aiming to correct some early research on who voted for
Chávez and to address the highly counterintuitive question of why some
prominent elites supported Chávez’s 1998 electoral bid. To address the
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first point, Gates attempts to respecify why voters selected Chávez
(136–38). As expected from explanations in the literature centered on
corruption, failed institutions, and social polarization, she finds that
people who voted for Chavez in 1998 were indeed more likely not to
be supportive of democracy, to want an anticorruption candidate, and
to be more optimistic than other voters. But, she argues, these values
were mediated by people’s feelings of support for the business community, and for her, the support for business becomes a crucial intervening variable. While there were other anticorruption and antineoliberal candidates, it was Chávez’s perceived hostility toward business that
helped distinguish him from other candidates (26–27).
But if Chávez were not only antineoliberal but antibusiness, why
would elites support his bid for the presidency? Here Gates analyzes indepth interviews and finds that Chávez’s support from elites came
mostly from outliers who were dependent on the state and supported
him to ensure access, and not because they preferred protectionist policies or statism. It is important that most of the elites who supported
Chavez were critical of or had been hurt by the politicized banking
recovery under presidents Velázquez and Caldera. These elites worried
that key architects of that policy were associated with the Salas Romer
campaign and would punish them if Salas Romer won.
The book conveys some very important implications for the literature
on state-business relations. Drawing on Corrales 2002, Gates shows
how policies are often designed not to benefit specific industries but specific corporations in those industries, and to punish others (134–36). This
argument should be pushed further to give an idea of what such a personalized, privatized, partisan state means, and it may very well support
regime-based explanations of Chavismo, such as that of Corrales and Penfold. A question of greater concern is that, although published a decade
later, the book does not go beyond the 1998 elections. It would be interesting to see whether elites continued to support Chávez in future elections and how the return to statism has or has not rewarded elite outliers,
particularly given that President Chávez regularly, publicly, and personally threatens elites and their business interests and has nationalized a
number of companies in key sectors and those with labor disputes. This
sets up an important tension between an antineoliberal government and
the liberal claims of market actors for a self-constraining state.
Such a state, liberal arguments suggest, is more capable of holding
itself accountable and being held accountable by others. This point is
salient because although Chávez’s campaign against corruption helped
bring him into office, similar claims are made by the opposition, which
argues that weakening horizontal accountability mechanisms has exacerbated corruption (Corrales and Penfold). Corruption certainly plays an
important role in voter decisions, but it is likely that corruption plays into
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a larger political narrative that is performed, often ad nauseum, in public
and private spaces in Venezuela. Instead of looking at whether corruption is listed as a motive, it would be valuable to see how and why corruption is so frequently employed in public discourse. Caution should be
exercised, however, since, as Canache and Allison (2005) find, perceptions of corruption are often higher in contexts where citizens actively
follow politics. This explains the relatively high perception of corruption
in Chile and Uruguay. If political interest and media consumption affect
perceptions of corruption there, it must also be the case in Bolivarian
Venezuela, where politics is one of the most common subjects of discussion and where media outlets are, almost without fail, highly partisan.
It is interesting that discussion—that is, in poststructural and constructivist accounts of populism—is where Hawkins situates his effort to
produce a positivist understanding of populism that can withstand rigorous, testable, large-N methods. Drawing on Laclau 2005, de la Torre
2010, and Panizza 2009, among others, Hawkins understands populism
dialogically, as a worldview rather than a set of policies. Although populism is “not entirely undemocratic,” it is Manichean and antipluralist,
and it contributes to the tension between the normative and procedural
content of democracy (5, 56).
To operationalize populism, Hawkins defines the term and then creates a database of public speeches by 40 political figures in Latin America and elsewhere. He tests the content of the speeches and grades them
in terms of how populist each is (13). High levels of populism in
speeches by Chávez and others (including former U.S. president George
W. Bush), but not in speeches by Lula da Silva or Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, serve to validate his notion of populism.
Hawkins’s database and definition of populism offer significant
advances for a positivist approach to the concept. They are bolstered by
empirical analysis that helps explain the context in which speeches
were given. Caution should be used in selecting speeches, however,
because populism may be not the language of populists but rather a language of differentiation in specific periods or in moments of crisis
(Panizza 2009). In that case, speech selection must be done very carefully by regional experts who can distinguish between permanent populist content and its periodic appearance.
But Hawkins’s understanding of political mobilization in Venezuela
is deep. What is most of interest to this review is his response to the
question he poses, how Venezuela moved from democratic pluralism to
populism. He analyzes who participates in the Bolivarian Circles. He
shows that the Manichean and antipluralist worldview of activists contributes to populists’ “mistrust of hierarchical forms of organization,” use
of “disruptive tactics in order to express their . . . outrage with the
system,” and the weight they place on “large numbers to demonstrate
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their state as the people” (168). All of this tends to “create a poorly institutionalized movement” and weakens the possibility for individual dissent and agency. Activists who were involved in Bolivarian Circles did
not always display antidemocratic values, but they “demonstrated many
of the negative consequences of a populist worldview or discourse,
including an anything goes attitude and an equivocal attitude toward citizenship and procedural rights for members of the opposition” (194).
While Hawkins admits to the democratizing potential of populism,
he is very concerned about its antipluralist nature and the antiliberal
politics it often encourages. Fernandes, by contrast, offers a political
anthropological counterbalance that highlights plurality, if not always
pluralism, in a context of a movement that is trying to spread outside
neoliberal boundaries.
Fernandes looks at community activism, particularly in the barrios
of 23 de Enero and San Augustín, to study the interaction between the
state and urban social movements. Her case studies include community
cultural groups, community radio, and the takeover of the Alameda Theater. Her aim is to explore the tensions between groups who are sympathetic to Chávez and often take money from the state but aim for
some autonomy. They do not fit into easy “liberal” categories of “civil
society” (Smilde and Hellinger 2011), and although the Chávez state is
“postneoliberal” (19) and has antineoliberal aims (it increased cultural
funding, supported public and community media, recognized the marginalized), she argues that it continues to employ “neoliberal governmentality” (22–23).
Illustrating the tension between antineoliberalism and an overarching neoliberal governmentality is an important contribution. In her
analysis of CONATEL (National Commission of Telecommunications)
and other regulatory bodies, Fernandes finds that government agents
insist that community organizations form foundations, with boards of
directors, before they get money or licenses. Instead of democracy
being “in the streets,” as Chavistas often claim, she finds that people are
democratizing agents, but that they encounter unanticipated obstacles in
Chavista technocrats and bureaucrats, whose framing techniques are
alienating and disempowering, similar to what prevailed under more
neoliberal governments. She shows this clearly in her analysis of an
event in which a middle-class bureaucrat speaks to community activists
about culture being something produced (elsewhere) and brought to
the communities to be consumed. The bureaucrat, officially a facilitator,
not only defines culture for the potential “agents,” but also reframes the
words activists use during their group work back into the language of
the organization (144–48). The rest of the book shows similar “struggles
between . . . social movements drawing on place-based consciousness,
historical memory, and oral narrative to justify claims over public space
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and access to resources, and . . . administrators who deploy instrumental and qualitative approaches in their management of community-based
programs and organizations” (233).
Fernandes’s work is both original and successful in complicating
images of Chavismo. Its bottom-up approach, its deft handling of plurality in the movement and tensions between autonomy, antineoliberalism,
and support for President Chávez, and its framing motif of neoliberal governmentality are important contributions to scholarship on Venezuela.
The last, however, while very helpful, needs further elaboration.
Fernandes’s description of neoliberal governmentality offers an
important perspective for dealing with the liberalism-substantivism
debate. She, like other scholars who support a “postneoliberalism” (Postero 2010), is concerned that “the lack of institutional mediation, which
has provided the grounds for urban social movements to grow and
flourish, also proved to be problematic as these movements found
themselves without the kind of union representation or party structures
that could defend their interests against the state” (234).
Fernandes thereby offers an important internal critique, but it opens
up a pressing methodological issue. In the appeal to liberal concerns, in
which groups seek autonomy from the state and organize to hold it
accountable, a challenge emerges in that postliberalism does not distinguish the state from the government as clearly as liberalism does. This
is a critical issue for postliberal approaches to address, particularly given
the regular conflation of state and government in Venezuela in the language of both Chavismo and its opposition (Smilde and Hellinger 2011;
Spanakos 2011).
It is, indeed, part of the rhetoric of the Proceso not to make such a
distinction. Rather than separate government and state, Chavismo looks
to form authentic linkages between the people and the political apparatus of power. Understanding this normative approach, as Fernandes
does, is critical.
The state-government distinction is important for scholars who are
trying to explicate postliberalism. Fernandes refers to the Bolivarian Circles as “state-promoted” (28–29, 191), but were these state- or government-promoted? When Chávez commemorates his return to the presidency after the coup of April 11, 2002, he does so as head of
government, not state (Spanakos 2011). The 2000 Constitution and some
of the misiones, however, have now been accepted even by the opposition as part of the state.
This debate obviously involves the question of how legitimacy is
developed over time, but it also opens the issue of how to differentiate
between state and government. There are a number of methodological
concerns when the government organizes civil society (see Smilde and
Hellinger 2011), but the most obvious is how to address the legacy of
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liberalism, which sees this as an obvious threat to political pluralism
(Brewer-Carías 399–400; Hawkins).

(POST)LIBERALISM: QUO VADIS?
Although Corrales and Penfold are correct that neoliberal economic
reforms did not gain long-term credibility in Venezuela because of its oil
dependence (5), neoliberalism has played, and continues to play, an
important role in terms of framing policy “delivery,” even in the openly
antineoliberal governments of Hugo Chávez (Fernandes). This is a challenge to antineoliberal politics and policymakers, as well as to their
opposition, but it is especially so to scholars who need to address how
a postliberal polity should be conceived.
The most familiar framework is that of the institutional versus radical left (Castañeda 2006). Although the dichotomy has been critiqued by
many, most critiques rely on institutional quality and constraints on
public power, and this framework privileges liberal readings, even of
postneoliberal governments. Oxhorn and Postero (2010) combine institutional quality with degrees of inclusion to distance postliberalism a
little further from liberalism. Arditi goes further still, offering a more
alternative approach that draws on Jacques Rancière’s concept of dissensus/disagreement, in which the contestation of actors is not within
the realm of policies but “within the coordinates of a given horizon of
possibilities, contending forces, and alternative projects and policies”
(Arditi 2008, 63). But a politics of multitudes leads to messy institutional,
semi-institutional, and noninstitutionalizable forms of politics (Arditi
2008, 80), making systematic analysis far more problematic. It also problematizes what institutions are, and how the stability and inclusion they
produce are understood. Specifically, future research will probably have
to focus on institutionality rather than institutions per se.
Although Fernandes is sympathetic to the alternative approach
Arditi suggests, and she does not see liberal institutions as the only
means of checking state power, she admits that a participatory and contestatory culture is necessary but not sufficient for “substantive democracy” (231). Postliberalism still appears to rely on liberalism, particularly
for its preferences for institutions, accountability, and protection of dissent (see Oxhorn and Postero 2010; Panizza 2009). At the same time,
the institutions of liberal democracy, still nascent, have yet to “deliver”
to the citizenry as a whole, to use neoliberal terminology. So Latin
American democracies may be shifting toward postliberalism without
ever truly being liberal.
The ambiguous status of what exactly is postliberalism, as Arditi
(2008) notes, may make for seemingly inconsistent and somewhat
unpredictable policies, and scholars need to deal with mixtures of lib-
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eralism, pluralism, and populism and the effects of these on behavior,
institutions, socioeconomic inclusion, and democracy. The books
reviewed here show that the underlying axis of liberalism and substantivism remains relevant while scholars grapple with what postliberalism,
if it is truly post, means.

NOTE
The author is grateful to Alfred Montero for his comments on an earlier
draft of this essay.
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